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Research Security Definitions

Research Security Definitions

– A list of foreign institutions that have been confirmed as engaging in "problematic activity" as described in §1286(c)(8)(A) of the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. The §1286 List is subject to change--the FY 2024 list can be found here. As noted by DoD, caution is advised for any researcher or institution engaging with institutions on this list.

– As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, a list of People's Republic of China (PRC) military companies operating directly or indirectly in the United States. This list identifies, among other things, Military-Civil Fusion contributors. The PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy supports the modernization goals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by ensuring it can acquire advanced technologies and expertise developed by PRC companies, universities, and research programs that appear to be civilian entities.

– The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s China Defence Universities Tracker is a database of academic institutions in China, providing risk ratings based on their connections to military, defense, and security entities.

– Found at Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the BIS Entity List contains names of certain foreign persons – including businesses, research institutions, universities, government and private organizations, individuals, and other types of legal persons – that are subject to specific license requirements for the export, reexport and/or transfer (in-country) of specified items. The sanctions imposed against most entities on this list are broad, covering almost any type of item or technology, including, but certainly not limited to, intangible technology (e.g., source code or proprietary information), software, equipment, office supplies, and gifts. While there are a few narrowly defined activities that may be conducted with an entity on the BIS Entity List without a license (e.g., sharing public domain information or results of Fundamental Research), nothing may be exported to that entity or its employees. BIS considers transactions of any nature with an entity on the BIS Entity List to be a "red flag" and recommends that U.S. institutions proceed with caution with respect to such transactions. Violations of the BIS Entity List sanctions carry severe (criminal and civil) penalties for IU and its faculty/staff. Any proposed activity with an entity on the BIS Entity List should be vetted by RSO prior to commencement.

– means an individual who – (A) contributes in a substantive, meaningful way to the scientific development or execution of a research and development project proposed to be carried out with a research and development award from a Federal research agency; and (B) is designated as a covered individual by the Federal research agency concerned. (See: 42 USC § 19237(1)).

– means technical data, software, technology, materials, equipment, biological agents, services, or research activities that are subject to U.S. export control laws or regulations, including but not limited to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), or regulations administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Export-controlled subject mattermay include defense articles and defense services identified on the U.S. Munitions List (USML); dual-use items, technology, and software identified on the Commerce Control List (CCL); and technical information required for the design, development, production, operation, maintenance, or use of such items. Examples of export-controlled subject matter include, but are not limited to:

military or space-related technologies;
satellite and aerospace systems;
advanced semiconductor, microelectronics, and quantum technologies;
certain high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, or encryption technologies;
nuclear technologies; controlled chemical, biological, and toxin-related materials and technologies; and
other items, technologies, software, or technical data subject to U.S. export control requirements.

– means China, North Korea, Russia, Iran, or any other country determined to be a country of concern by the Secretary of State. (See: 42 USC § 19237(2)). Foreign Country of Concern also includes Venezuela and Cuba, per Indiana Executive Order 25-64, and any other countries subsequently added pursuant to Indiana Code § 1-1-16-8(b).

– as defined in policy RP-11-012 – means an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of an FCOC. For illustration, and without limiting the foregoing, the following are FEOCs:

a company or entity organized under the laws of an FCOC;
a company or entity headquartered in an FCOC;
a university located in an FCOC; and
any governmental entity of an FCOC.

– means an effort organized, managed, or funded by a government of a Foreign Country of Concern, or a foreign government entity of a Foreign Country of Concern, to recruit science and technology professionals or students (regardless of citizenship or national origin, or whether having a full-time or part-time position).

– refers to basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community; as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons. This concept was first formally defined as such in National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189).

Definitions for fundamental research are codified in U.S. export control regulations under the EAR and ITAR. Under the EAR, at 15 CFR § 734.8(c), fundamental research is defined as:

“Research in science, engineering, or mathematics, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the research community, and for which the researchers have not accepted restrictions for proprietary or national security reasons.”

Under the ITAR, at 22 CFR § 120.34(a)(8), fundamental research is defined as:

“Basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from research the results of which are restricted for proprietary reasons or specific U.S. Government access and dissemination controls.” The ITAR further indicates that “university research will not be considered fundamental research if: (i) The University or its researchers accept other restrictions on publication of scientific and technical information resulting from the project or activity; or (ii) The research is funded by the U.S. Government and specific access and dissemination controls protecting information resulting from the research are applicable.”

– Below is the statutory definition of a “Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program” or “MFTRP” as defined in § 10638 (4) of the CHIPS and Science Act (42 USC § 19237 (4)).

The term "malign foreign talent recruitment program" means—

(A) any program, position, or activity that includes compensation in the form of cash, in-kind compensation, including research funding, promised future compensation, complimentary foreign travel, things of non de minimis value, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, or other types of remuneration or consideration directly provided by a foreign country at any level (national, provincial, or local) or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country, whether or not directly sponsored by the foreign country, to the targeted individual, whether directly or indirectly stated in the arrangement, contract, or other documentation at issue, in exchange for the individual—

(i) engaging in the unauthorized transfer of intellectual property, materials, data products, or other nonpublic information owned by a United States entity or developed with a Federal research and development award to the government of a foreign country or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country regardless of whether that government or entity provided support for the development of the intellectual property, materials, or data products;

(ii) being required to recruit trainees or researchers to enroll in such program, position, or activity;

(iii) establishing a laboratory or company, accepting a faculty position, or undertaking any other employment or appointment in a foreign country or with an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country if such activities are in violation of the standard terms and conditions of a Federal research and development award;

(iv) being unable to terminate the foreign talent recruitment program contract or agreement except in extraordinary circumstances;

(v) through funding or effort related to the foreign talent recruitment program, being limited in the capacity to carry out a research and development award or required to engage in work that would result in substantial overlap or duplication with a Federal research and development award;

(vi) being required to apply for and successfully receive funding from the sponsoring foreign government’s funding agencies with the sponsoring foreign organization as the recipient;

(vii) being required to omit acknowledgment of the recipient institution with which the individual is affiliated, or the Federal research agency sponsoring the research and development award, contrary to the institutional policies or standard terms and conditions of the Federal research and development award;

(viii) being required to not disclose to the Federal research agency or employing institution the participation of such individual in such program, position, or activity; or

(ix) having a conflict of interest or conflict of commitment contrary to the standard terms and conditions of the Federal research and development award; and

(B) a program that is sponsored by—

(i) a foreign country of concern or an entity based in a foreign country of concern, whether or not directly sponsored by the foreign country of concern;

(ii) an academic institution on the list developed under section 1286(c)(8) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 2358 note; [1] Public Law 115–232); or

(iii) a foreign talent recruitment program on the list developed under section 1286(c)(9) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 2358 note; ¹ Public Law 115–232).

– State Key Laboratories in the People’s Republic of China are overseen, and often co-located, with universities and other enterprises in China. SKLs receive funding, administrative support, and policy and developmental guidance from China’s central government. SKLs serve as a primary driver of China’s strategic basic research efforts and ambitious science and technology agenda in the commercial and military spaces. See: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas-state-key-laboratory-system/.

Research Security Office

Research Security Definitions